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We consider a congestible road, where the cost of travel increases with the number of 
users on the road and decreases with capacity. Those persons who do not use the road 
favor a toll which would maximize revenue, and they oppose spending on road 
capacity. Users of the road prefer a low toll and a large capacity financed by general 
revenues. We describe conditions that make majority voting lead to a toll and capacity 
level that equals the socially optimal toll and capacity, that is smaller, or that is larger. 
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 Introduction  
 
Road charges (including gasoline taxes, tolls, automobile registration fees, and so on) 
have several attractive features. Road charges can be fair, since users of the road pay 
for the construction and maintenance of the roads, rather than all citizens. Road 
charges can reveal taxpayer preferences for the public service (the seminal work is 
Buchanan (1963)). Road charges may be part of a tax system which redistributes 
income from the rich (such as car owners) to the poor (such as the unemployed or 
users of mass transit). The charges can reduce the externalities generated by road use; 
since road users suffer from some of the externalities (in particular from congestion), 
road charges may be more politically popular than are other Pigovian taxes. Lastly, 
when demand is inelastic, road charges can be an important source of government 
revenues. This paper focuses on the last two aspects. But rather than view charges as 
redistributive instruments to the poor, we will look at selfish voters, with each 
preferring a road charge that benefits himself. Although we could consider a wide 
range of externalities, we will focus on congestion, the externality that empirically 
appears most important.
1 Since much of our interest lies in examining the road charge 
preferred by users of the road (who will be the majority of the voters in many rich 
countries), and since we want to explain why road charges are often small, the focus 
on congestion poses a greater challenge than an examination of other externalities.  
 
It is well known that road tolls can solve congestion problems (see Walters (1961)), 
and can increase social welfare. But the toll may nevertheless hurt some people. A 
policy of imposing a congestion toll without redistributing the revenue to users will 
make at least some consumers worse off (see Weitzman (1974), Glazer (1981), and 
Niskanen (1987)). The intuition, as Evans (1992) notes, is that a congestion toll 
cannot increase the welfare of all consumers. For the welfare of some consumers can 
increase only if fewer persons use the road. But use will decline only if the costs (toll 
costs plus time costs) increase for at least some users. These persons are necessarily 
worse off. This situation effectively holds even if the toll revenue is returned to the 
population, but the number of people who pay the toll is small compared to the 
population as a whole, and the toll revenue is distributed among the whole population. 
And, of course, when people differ, and the toll revenue is distributed among the 
whole population, both those who pay the toll and those who do not, then consumers 
who do not pay the toll are necessarily better off.  
 
We see then that, in general, a congestion toll will benefit some people and hurt 
others. The question naturally arises what toll would be adopted by a government that 
responds to the preferences of the public. We address that issue. We begin with the 
standard Downsian model, where policy is set by the median voter. The Downsian 
model can apply both to elections in which two candidates vie for election, and to 
referenda. A potential limitation of the Downsian model is that it may apply only to a 
single issue, with single-peaked preferences. But we shall see that under reasonable 
assumptions, the Downsian model can apply when voters must decide both on users 
fees and on investment. And under reasonable assumptions the preferences of voters 
over fees or over investment will indeed be single peaked. 
 
                                                 
1See Proost et al (2002) for evidence on the European Union; see Small and Verhoef (2007) for 
evidence on the United States.. Our conclusions would also apply under other views of elections. In particular, under 
our assumptions the citizen-candidate model (see Besley and Coate (1997) could have 
the median voter run for office, win election, and determine policy. And rather than 
let any policy be allowed on the agenda, we could extend the model to consider an 
agenda setter (as in Romer and Rosenthal (1979)). The toll would then not be the one 
preferred by the median voter; but the qualitative results, such as that the toll will be 
higher if the median voter is a driver than if he is not, will continue to hold. 
 
Other work which explicitly models voting on congestion tolls is Marcucci, Marini 
and Davide (2005). That paper considers three homogeneous groups, and a citizen-
candidate model. In contrast we allow for a continuum of voters, where the 
preferences of the median voter determine policy. We think that such a model is 
particularly relevant for congestion tolls because it readily applies to referenda, which 
have indeed been used in Edinburgh and in Stockholm. And whereas they restrict the 
use of the revenues to subsidize public transport, we allow revenues to be returned to 
the public. We further extend the analysis by considering the preferences of voters 
over investment in capacity. 
 
Another paper which discusses the politics of pricing in transportation is Corneo 
(1997). He shows that if the median income in the populations is the same as the 
mean income, then voting will result in pricing of the transit authority that is the same 
as marginal cost pricing, with fixed costs covered by a subsidy: the median voter is 
also the average voter, which means that maximizing his welfare is the same as 
maximising society’s average welfare. Such a result does not hold in our model---the 
median voter does not care about the loss in consumer surplus for persons induced not 
to drive because of a toll, nor does he value the gain to other consumers from the toll 
he may pay. 
The  model 
 
Consider an area where road capacity is given at a level K and where congestion is 
more or less homogeneous in the whole area. Assume further that the location of 
activities is fixed.    
 
Each of a large number, N, of individuals (i=1,..,N) can choose to take a trip or not. 
The gross benefit of taking the trip is distributed between 0 and Z. Call the gross 
benefit of a trip to the individual indexed by n as  z(n), where z(1)=Z and z(N)=0. 
Denote by n the number of persons who choose to make the trip; the marginal 
consumer is then the individual indexed by n. The number n will be determined 
endogenously. Let the capacity (or size) of the road be K, and let the toll be τ. The 
total cost of a trip, g(n,K,τ), consists of three terms: (1) the toll τ; (2) a fixed term  a 
(for example, the cost of a car); (3) a time cost that is the value of time multiplied by 
the time T it takes for a trip. Because of congestion, the time T (and so total trip cost 
g) increases with n and declines with K. In particular, let the cost be   
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 The toll revenue finances a lump-sum transfer of L to each individual (whether he 
pays the toll or not), and covers the rental cost of the road capacity (rK). The 
government’s budget constraint is 
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  For later use, define the function τ(n) as the toll paid by the last driver n that still  
wants to make the trip: 
  () () .
n
nz na b T
K
τ ⎛⎞ =− − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (4) 
Since z(n) declines with n,  and T increases with n, it follows that τ(n) declines with n. 
 
We first study the choice of the toll, keeping the capacity constant.
3 Next we study the 





It is instructive to begin with some simple examples. Suppose first that a minority of 
consumers value a trip at a positive value, a majority value it at zero, and that 
congestion is non-existent. Then clearly the socially optimal solution is a zero toll. 
But the majority will favour a toll that maximizes toll revenue, since that maximizes 
the per capita transfer, L. In short, the toll chosen by a majority will exceed the 




As the next simple case, suppose all consumers are identical---each has the same 
value from a trip, and each bears the same cost of making a trip for any given level of 
congestion. Suppose, in contrast to the previous case, that congestion, or travel time, 
increases with the number of trips. The assumptions just made are equivalent to those 
used in the standard model of the Tragedy of the Commons. One characteristic of 
such a model is that the revenue-maximizing toll is identical to the toll that maximizes 
social welfare: because the consumers are identical, a monopolist can extract all 
consumer surplus, and so internalizes the effects of congestion on the willingness of 
                                                 
2We can extend the model description into a full general equilibrium model by adding a linear 
production technology. As long as there are no other taxes (or other distortions) in the model this does 
not generate additional insights. One extension of the model could be congested freight traffic. See 
Mayeres and Proost (1997) for a simple model with passengers, freight, different types of tax 
distortions and different income groups. 
3 This capacity could be some minimum level available at very low cost or it could be constrained level 
that can not be extended because of natural barriers. consumers to pay for a trip. If he faces zero marginal cost of providing service, then 
maximizing profits is equivalent to maximizing revenue, which in turn maximizes net 
benefits from use of the road. Here, then, the toll that would be chosen by a majority 
of voters would be identical to the toll maximizing social welfare. 
 
Note that this result applies both when a majority uses the road and when a majority 
does not. If the majority does not use the road, then clearly any person who does not 
use the road aims to maximize toll revenue, which in turn maximizes the per capita 
grant, L. But the same holds when the majority does use the road. Under any toll, the 
number of users will be such that each user enjoys zero consumer surplus. So the only 
consideration to a user is the per capita transfer, L. Once again, each voter will favour 
the revenue-maximizing toll. 
 
We turn next to the more complicated cases where congestion is present, but 
consumers differ in their valuations of trips. 
 
The socially optimal solution  
 
Before analyzing the solution when the median voter determines the toll, it is 
instructive to analyze the socially optimal solution. We follow the standard analysis 
here. Using the definition of the utility function and the budget constraint for the 
government, we can define the socially optimal solution by looking for the value n* 
that maximizes the total consumer surplus minus the total trip costs excluding the toll. 
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The optimal number of users, n*, satisfies 
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This condition implies that the welfare-maximizing toll equals the marginal external 
congestion cost: 









Remember that this social optimum is obtained by maximising the sum of all utilities, 
using an equal weight for a unit of income for all individuals. It pays no attention to 
the distribution of income.
4  
 
The median-voter solution  
 
We now suppose that the level of the toll is fixed by a simple majority vote. If single 
peakedness conditions are satisfied, then the policy adopted by the government will 
be that preferred by the median voter, which in our model means the voter with the 
median valuation of a trip, or with valuation z(N/2). Note that under our assumptions, 
                                                 
4 See Mayeres and Proost (1997) for an approach that integrates income redistribution objectives. all individuals who do not take the trip have the same objective (maximizing the per 
capita transfer L). And all individuals who do use the road have the same objective 
(maximize the difference between the transfer L, and the cost of a trip (a+bT)). 
Whether a person makes the trip or not depends, however, on the toll. Also note that if 
the individual indexed by N/2 makes the trip, than all persons with valuations (z) 
higher than his will also make the trip, and will therefore favor the toll individual N/2 
favors. And if individual N/2 does not make the trip, then all persons with valuations 
(z) less than his will prefer not to make the trip, and therefore will favor the toll that 




Note that a majority may favor a toll even if a majority of voters are drivers, and the 
toll revenue is not returned to users. This can be seen with a modified version of the 
Tragedy of the Commons model. Suppose one homogeneous group of persons, a 
majority, place a high value on a trip, and also have a high value of time. Another 
group has a lower value of time. The equilibrium with no tolls can have all the high-
valuers use the road, some of the low-valuers use the road, and each low valuer enjoys 
zero consumer surplus. The extensive use of the road means, however, that the high-
valuers suffer greatly from congestion. Now suppose a toll reduces the number of 
low-valuers using the road. The high-valuers also pay the toll, but the lower 
congestion can raise their consumer surplus. A majority may therefore favor a 
congestion toll, though the toll revenue is wasted. This is considered in Marcucci et 
al.(2005). 
 
Median voter drives 
 
We consider two cases: the median voter drives or does not. Suppose first that the 
median voter (indexed by N/2) takes the trip. His utility-maximizing toll differs from 
the socially optimal toll because with the uniform lump-sum transfer in place to 
balance the budget (cf. (2)), he will only receive back a fraction of what he paid as a 
toll. More specifically, a median voter who finds it optimal to drive will select a 
number of users nτ (and a corresponding toll τ(nτ)) that minimizes the sum of his trip 
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As can be seen, the median voter, if he drives, will only receive a share nτ /N of the 
toll he paid.  
 
Government adopts the toll satisfying 
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5The preferences of the median voter on the toll may not be single peaked. One peak could be a small 
toll, preferred by him as a user, another peak could be the revenue maximising toll preferred by him as 
a non user.   
The median voter need not favor a positive toll.
6 In (9), the first term is always 
positive; the second term is always negative. When the congestion function is 
relatively flat and nτ is only marginally larger than N/2, the second term in (9) may 
dominate; the median voter may want to subsidize trips rather than to toll them. In this 
way he can extract tax revenue (L becomes negative) from all the persons who do not 
make the trip.  
Median voter does not drive 
 
As the second case, let the median voter choose not to make the trip. He then wants n0 
to maximize 
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which leads him to choose a toll satisfying 







This condition means that when the median voter does not drive, he maximizes the 
toll revenue he can extract from the road users.  
 
The median voter thus will choose the toll given by either (9) or (11). The median 
voter will prefer the toll which induces him not to drive if  
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Linear valuation function and linear congestion function 
 
When the congestion function and the z(n) function are linear,
7 we can sign most of 













We find the following values for n* (the socially optimal number of users), nτ (the 
number of users when the median voter drives), and n0 (the number of users when the 
median voter does not drive): 
                                                 
6For the preference of the median voter (if he remains a car diver) to be single peaked in n* (and τ(n*)) 
in the domain [N/2, N-1], it suffices that the congestion function is convex.  














 and this is negative if the congestion function is convex. 



















































That is, the toll preferred by the median voter when he does not use the road is greater 
than the socially optimal toll; in turn, the socially optimal toll is greater than the toll 
the median voter prefers when he does use the road. 
 
Remember that nτ can be negative so that, even in the absence of congestion, the 
majority of car users may favor a subsidy that can take the form of costs (maintenance 
costs, air pollution costs, etc.) that are paid by the whole population.  
 
The comparison of the revenue-maximizing toll to the socially-optimal toll follows 
the results of Mills (1981). If users with low reservation prices for facility access are 
more sensitive to congestion than are users with high reservation prices, then, as  
Mills (1981) shows, the monopolist will set a toll above the socially optimal one. In 
our terms, if people differ in their value of time, then the revenue-maximizing toll 
exceeds the socially-optimal toll. 
 
In our model with differences in the value of trips, the marginal user is indifferent 
between the revenue-maximizing toll and the toll that maximizes his benefit as a user. 
And any one with a lower valuation of trips wants a lower toll than the marginal user. 
So if the median voter is a user, he wants a toll lower than the revenue-maximizing 
toll. 
Choice of capacity in the absence of tolling  
 
We turn next to the choice of capacity. When the toll is zero, the number of users is 
determined only by the road capacity. The socially-optimal capacity can be derived by 
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The number of users as a function of the capacity is given by the user equilibrium 
equation where for the last user n(K):  
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Define the cost of a trip (exclusive of tolls), a+bT(n/K), as average cost or AC. If 
there is no corner solution (that is, if K>0), the first-order condition determines the 




(( ) ) (( ) ) ( ) 0
'( )
() | () () . n
nK nK d A C
znK A CnK nK r
KK d K
dAC AC bT n K
rn K n K n K
dK K K K
∂∂ ⎡⎤ −− − = ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ⎣⎦




We see that capacity should be increased up to the point where the marginal cost of 
capacity (r) equals the fall in average user costs (AC) for given number of drivers 
minus the increase in user costs generated by the increased number of drivers. In the 
absence of user pricing, the induced driving reduces the benefits to the existing 
drivers. 
 
The choice made by the median voter will again depend on whether he drives or not.  
 
If he chooses not to drive, he gains nothing from road capacity: he must share in the 
costs, will have no toll revenues, and will gain no benefit from capacity. There would 
either be no traffic or one could imagine a corner solution where the minimum level 
of capacity is made available.  
 
If the median voter drives, he will select K (and indirectly n) to minimize his user cost 
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Comparing (20) with the condition for the socially-optimal capacity, we see that the 
median voter, when he drives, exploits the common pool effect. He pays only 1/N of 
the cost of extra capacity and he considers as a benefit only his own user cost and the 
negative effect on his user cost of induced driving.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates why the median voter, when he chooses to drive, will always 




=−  (as in (18)) represent the marginal social cost of capacity. The socially optimal solution has 
MB=r/n(K). But the median voter is only one of n users, and one of only N taxpayers. 
The median voter therefore wants a capacity at which MB=r/N. Since n(K) < N, the 
capacity preferred by the median voter always exceeds the socially-optimal level. This 
ordering arises from a pure common-pool effect (see Persson (1998)): when the public 
good is paid by everybody equally, the oversupply of capacity declines with the 
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Figure 1 When tolling is absent, the median voter, if he drives, always prefers a 
road capacity larger than the socially optimal  
 
To see whether the median voter prefers to drive or not, we must analyze his utility at 
the socially-optimal capacity. Unfortunately, even in the linear case, these conditions 
are not very tractable.  
 
Choice of capacity with tolling  
 
Consider next the choice of capacity when the road can be tolled. We discuss first the 
socially-optimal solution. When a planner can control both tolls and capacity, he will 
select the same toll (equal to the marginal external congestion cost), as in the fixed 
capacity case, with the toll evaluated at the optimal capacity. Because drivers face a 
toll equal to marginal cost, increased capacity will no longer induce traffic that 
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This solution can be compared with the choices made by a median voter who decides 
to drive or not. 
  
If the median voter does not drive, he will benefit from expanded capacity only if 

















For a given number of trips, the optimal capacity for the median voter who does not 
drive minimizes the user costs for all drivers and is therefore the same as the socially 
optimal capacity for that given number of trips. But as the revenue-maximizing 
number of users, n°, will be smaller, the revenue-maximizing capacity will be smaller 
too. 
 
If the median voter does drive, we will have a combination of the tolling rule and the 





















We can compare the toll and capacity combinations chosen by a welfare optimizer 
and by a median voter who drives or not by comparing the systems of first-order 
conditions. These determine the choices if there are no corner solutions. The welfare 
optimizing choice and the median voter choice each has an equation that determines 
the optimal toll for a given capacity and an equation that determines the optimal 
capacity for a given toll. This system of equations can be represented graphically as in 
Figure 2.
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Figure 2 Toll and capacity choices of the median voter compared with the 
socially-optimal choice 
 
First, we know that for any given K, we have τ 
med < τ* < τ°. Though τ° (the toll when 
the median voter does not drive) does not necessarily decline with K, the values of 
τ
med (the toll when the median voter drives) and τ* (the socially optimal toll) do 
decline with K. This gives us the three curves τ(K) that never intersect. Second, when 
it comes to investments for a given toll (and given n), we know that the median voter, 
who does not drive, would apply the same investment rule as under the socially 
optimal solution. We know that for a given toll and so for a given n, the median voter 
always prefers a higher capacity than the socially optimal capacity. This gives the two 
curves K(τ).  
 
Consequently, the median voter, if he drives, always prefers a capacity higher than 
the socially optimal capacity, and a toll lower than the socially optimal toll. When the 
median voter does not drive, he selects a toll higher than the socially optimal one, and 
a capacity smaller than the socially optimal toll. 
Comparative statics and development over time  
 
We are interested in knowing how the toll and capacity evolve over time when 
income grows and/or the costs or technology of road building change.  
 
For constant costs of road building, we can consider the following comparative static 
exercise. Assume that increased aggregate income increases the maximum willingness 
to pay for a trip in a linear way, as illustrated in Figure 3. We assume that an increase 
in average income from R1 to R2 rotates upward the willingness to pay curve for a 
trip from z(n,R1) to z(n,R2). We thus implicitly assume that the distribution of trip 
values is fixed and that all individuals make the same number of trips   N
z(n,R2) 






Figure 3 Representing an increase in average income in an economy as an 
increase in willingness to pay for a trip 
 
We can now study the effect of an increase in aggregate income when capacity is 
fixed. This could give a profile like in Figure 4. At low aggregate income levels, the 
median voter is not a driver and favors the revenue-maximizing toll. When aggregate 
income rises, the number of users will rise and so will the toll. Once a certain level of 
income is reached, the median voter’s valuation for a trip has become so high that he 
also wants to drive, and this means he favors a lower toll. When income continues to 
grow, the number of drivers keeps increasing and the median voter favors an increase 















Figure 4 Effect on toll levels of an aggregate increase in aggregate income when 
capacity is constant 
 
When we take the other extreme, no tolls are possible but capacity can be extended, 
we could see a pattern like in Figure 5. We see that, as long as the median voter does 
not drive, he gains nothing from capacity. Once he is a driver, capacity increases, and 


















Figure 5: Effect on capacity levels of an aggregate increase in aggregate income 
when tolling is infeasible 
 We thus predict that as income increases and the number of drivers increases, the 
median voter will switch from a person who does not drive to a person who does, and 





Since congestion tolls are so rare, it is difficult to test our models empirically. Other 
evidence, however, has some bearing on the reasonableness of our assumptions and of 
our results. 
 
A fair amount of research shows that gasoline taxes (which are related, though of 
course not identical, to road charges) respond to political pressures. In the United 
States, gasoline taxes are higher in states with Democratic governors (Besley and 
Rosen (1998)). In Europe, gasoline taxes are less likely to be increased in election 
years, and less likely to be increased the greater the number of registered vehicles in 
the country (Genser and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1992)). A comparison of 
gasoline prices in 86 democratic countries shows that they are lower in countries with 
presidential government than in countries with parliamentary government 
(Fredriksson and Millimet (2004). 
 
We predicted that road charges may decline with the number of drivers. Consider the 
motor fuel tax imposed by states in the United States.
9 Adjusted for inflation, the 
average gasoline tax declined by 10.7 cents between 1957 and 2002; indeed, in 49 of 
the 50 states
10 (Missouri is the exception) the inflation-adjusted tax declined. The 
federal gasoline tax in the United States has also declined over time. For example, the 
tax was 18.4 cents per gallon in 2006; adjusted for inflation, the tax in 1960 was 27.4 
cents, or 49% higher. So this is evidence that the taxes on road use have declined over 
time because income have made the median voter a driver as shown in the previous 
section. 
 
Anecdotal evidence shows that citizens can care deeply about road tolls. In 2006, 
supporters of Mexican presidential candidate Lopez Obrador attempted to gain public 
support by taking over toll booths and allowing motorists to enter Mexico City 
without paying tolls. Election results in Sweden are consistent with our model. In 
2006, voters in Stockholm supported a congestion toll; this cordon toll reduced 
congestion in the city, but did not require residents of the city to pay the toll. In 
contrast, citizens living in the Stockholm area but outside the city enjoyed the lower 
congestion, but had to pay the toll; these citizens voted against the congestion toll 
(http://www.thelocal.se/article.php?ID=4941, September 18, 2006).  
 
We have seen that if the median voter is not a driver, then he will favor the revenue-
maximizing toll; if he drives but congestion is not too bad, then he will favor a lower 
toll. That reasoning suggests that, within at least some range, an increase in aggregate 
driving will reduce the gasoline tax chosen by government; a study of OECD 
countries by Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner (2004) finds such an effect. 
                                                 
9   Data are from www.transact.org/progress/pdfs/February03/table_3.pdf, published by the 
Surface Transportation Policy Project, 1100 17th St., NW, 10th Floor, Washington, DC 20036 
10   Alaska and Hawaii became states after 1957; the data reflect taxes in 1959 for them.  
Lastly, recall our analysis of the Tragedy of the Commons, where we expect 
homogeneous voters to choose the toll that maximizes social welfare. Anderson, Holt, 
and Reiley (2006) conducted laboratory experiments with congestion generated by the 
Tragedy of the Commons. The interesting part for our purposes is that the 
experiments had subjects vote on a congestion toll, with the revenue redistributed to 
all subjects. The subjects initially set a toll below the socially optimal one (and so 
below the toll that the median voter would prefer), but in the final rounds of the 
experiment they settled on the socially optimal fee. So at least for a simple case, 




This paper used a simple model to show that a simple median voter model can explain 
why the real users’ prices for roads tend to decline. The main force driving this result 
is that the median voter, as long as he is not a driver, benefits from revenue 
maximizing tolls and from low spending on capacity. When he becomes a driver, he 
has an interest to oppose high tolls and wants more road capacity paid for by the 
general public.  
 
The simplicity of the model makes us mention several caveats. First, we used a 
uniform tax or subsidy as the alternative instrument to raise government revenues. 
When more complicated tax structures are in place, one can expect that the median 
voter also manipulates these in his favor. If he is not a driver, he may even be more 
keen to extract revenues from drivers because he may receive a share in the net 
revenues larger than 1/N; the opposite holds if he is a driver.  
 
Second, as the number of voting dimensions exceeds one, an equilibrium may not 
exist.  
 
Third, we have individuals varying in the valuation of a trip and not in the value of 
time. Variations in the value of time can be accommodated to some extent by 
redefining the valuation of a trip as also depending on the value of time.  
 
Fourth, we ignored other transportation modes. If the alternative is priced at marginal 
cost, our analysis is unaffected. The value of a trip is then redefined as the value of a 
road trip minus the value of the same trip on a different mode. When the other mode 
is not priced at marginal cost, our model needs reworking as there is second price and 
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